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Introduction 
Ingemar Lindh is a master of collective improvisation. To introduce him and his importance to 
20th-century laboratory theatre to English readers, I will quote extensively from various sources, 
particularly his book Pietre di Guado (Stepping Stones; 1998a), published posthumously. 
Lindh was born in 1945 in Gothenburg, Sweden. From 1966 to 1968 he studied with and 
assisted the founder and master of corporeal mime, Étienne Decroux, at the L’École de Mime di 
Étienne Decroux in Paris. In 1969 Lindh and three other students (Yves Lebreton, Maria Lexa, 
and Gisèle Pélisson) were expelled by Decroux after Lebreton disclosed their intention to visit 
Jerzy Grotowski in Poland for some months. This visit would have rendered further work on the 
demonstration-performance that Decroux had been painstakingly developing with his core 
group of collaborators impossible (De Marinis 1993:128–29). Decroux did try to salvage the 
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research he had done with the 
group by inviting Lindh, Lexa, 
and Pélisson to return to Paris, 
but they all stuck by Lebreton 
(129). Together the four founded 
Studio 2, “the first professional 
mime troupe in Scandinavia” 
(Watson 1993:6), and were soon 
approached by Eugenio Barba, 
who hosted the troupe at his 
Nordisk Teaterlaboratorium  
in Holstebro, Denmark. After  
a year and a half there (1969–
1970), Lindh returned to 
Sweden where he worked in 
Stockholm as a teacher at 
Teaterstudio and served as head 
of the mime faculty at the State 
School of Dance. 
In 1971 Lindh founded his own theatre laboratory, the Institutet för Scenkonst (Institute  
for Scenic Art), and for five years (1971–1976) the Institute operated in the isolated northern 
Swedish forests of Storhögen and Nyby. This intense period of formation and research was 
fraught with hardship. From 1976 to 1983, the nomadic Institute was without a permanent base, 
offering workshops to individuals and holding pedagogical residencies in Sweden and France 
(Lausanne and Conches in 1979; Vaudreuil Ville Nouvelle in 1979/1980). During the 18 months 
that followed this last residency, severe financial restrictions and the need to “find oneself” led 
individuals within the Institute to either break away and work on their own or stop altogether. 
During this period Barba invited Lindh to work in Holstebro and participate as a teacher in the 
1980 International School of Theatre Anthropology (ISTA) sessions at Porsgrunn (Norway) and 
Stockholm (Sweden), and in the 1981 sessions at Volterra (Italy). The members of the Institute 
began working together again in 1982. For the first four weeks they convened at the Nordisk 
Teaterlaboratorium during Odin Teatret’s absence, and then toured Germany, Spain, and Italy, 
with their performances Fresker (1979–1982) and Exercises in Solitude (1981) as well as giving 
workshops.
In 1983 the Institute moved to Italy, and in 1984 it found a home in the Teatro della Rosa 
(Theatre of the Rose), Pontremoli, where it operated until December 1996. During this period 
the group established the International Center for Autopedagogy and Theatre Research, and in 
1995 Lindh cofounded the xHCA (Questioning Human Creativity as Acting) research program 
at the University of Malta. He died suddenly, of a heart attack, in June 1997 during a break in a 
work session at the Summer University project of the University of Malta. Lindh’s book Pietre  
di Guado was published in 1998. The Institute is currently based in Nygård, Sweden, led by 
Lindh’s closest collaborators Magdalena Pietruska and Roger Rolin.
Bibliography
The number of published works on Ingemar Lindh is not commensurate with his prolific out- 
put as a practitioner. The material that exists in print is almost exclusively associated with his 
apprenticeship and work with Decroux (see Cruciani 1995:235–44; Lindh 1996; and De Marinis 
1999; see also Barba 1995:57, 89, 173). Publications that concern the Institute’s work on 
Figure 1. (facing page) Ingemar Lindh in the mime study L’Oiseau et Le Chasseur, at Teatro Laboratorio 
del G.A.S., La Spezia, Italy, 1984. (Photo by Stefano Lanzardo)
Figure 2. Étienne Decroux (left) and Ingemar Lindh, undated 











collective improvisation are mainly in Italian and Swedish (see Lindh 1998a, 1998b; Attisani 
1987; Giuntoni 2004; in English see Stanley 1991 and Lindh 1995). Most of this material is  
by Lindh himself and was not intended for publication: it includes transcripts of interviews, 
lectures, workshop discussions, and conference presentations as well as letters and diary entries 
by colleagues and students. The improvisational and performative quality of these texts is 
particularly appropriate when considering Lindh’s emphasis on the actor’s need to engage what 
he calls the “social situation” during collective improvisation. The solid grounding in the 
practice that characterizes Lindh’s published material is often accompanied by a sharp observa-
tion of human behavior in everyday life—an ability no doubt honed during his work with 
Decroux, who demanded clinical observation of human action. 
Pietre di Guado, for example, is “a book not written but spoken” (Lindh 1998a:xi).1 The  
first two chapters are based on a transcript of a workshop on collective improvisation, entitled 
“Stepping Stones,” conducted by Lindh for actors of Grenland Friteater in Porsgrunn, Norway, 
in 1981. Chapter 3 is made up of two long letters by Lindh to a friend, the first detailing his 
artistic biography and the second commenting on the knowledge acquired in the process. 
Chapter 4 is an interview with Lindh, and chapter 5 is a chronology of the Institute’s 25 years  
of operation under his direction. Photographs by Maurizio Buscarino and Stefano Lanzardo 
provide visual documentation of the Institute’s history and research. The book has the flavor of  
a collective improvisation, both in the way it eschews single authorhood and in the manner that 
certain themes recur in different contexts. A Swedish edition of the book appeared in 2003; the 
English, which I have edited and introduced, is set to appear in 2010.2 
Most English-speaking readers would have come across the name Ingemar Lindh in 
publication in Barba and Nicola Savarese’s A Dictionary of Theatre Anthropology, which features 
Lindh as an ISTA “invited artist” (2006:313).3 Indeed, much of Lindh’s bibliographical visibility 
is due to Barba, who invited him to Holstebro and ISTA on various occasions. A Dictionary  
of Theatre Anthropology features three sets of photographs by Savarese, which depict Lindh 
demonstrating exercises taken from Decroux (94–95, 204–05). All featured photos of Decroux  
in this book are attributed to Lindh (313).
Collective Improvisation
The rest of this essay will focus on Lindh’s major contribution to 20th-century theatre practice: 
the adoption of improvisation instead of directorial montage, fixed scores, and choreography  
as an organizing principle in the performance of theatre. In resisting single authorhood and 
fixed, predetermined structures, Lindh’s use of improvisation situates him within the context  
of postmodernity, and in the process marks him as a strategic case study in the current postdra-
matic debate.4 The crossroads of tradition and postmodernity marked by Lindh’s practice offers 
1. All quotations from Lindh’s Pietre di Guado (1998a) are based on the unpublished English translation by Benno 
Plassmann, Marlene Schranz, and Lindh’s close collaborator Magdalena Pietruska. All other translations from Ital-
ian sources into English are mine.
2. The first two books in the Black Mountain Press series dedicated to European Contemporary Classics/Theatre, 
namely Eugenio Barba’s Land of Ashes and Diamonds: My Apprenticeship in Poland (1999a) and Theatre: Solitude, 
Craft, Revolt (1999b), list Lindh’s Stepping Stones on the top of the list of “books already in the process of transla-
tion and production” (Barba 1999a:184; Barba 1999b:336). The back pages of the series’ latest publication, 
Krysztof Plesniarowicz’s The Dead Memory Machine: Tadeusz Kantor’s Theatre of Death (2004), still feature Stepping 
Stones as a future publication. The forthcoming English edition of Lindh’s book will be produced by a different 
publisher.
3. The second edition of this book is dedicated “to the memory of Katsuko Azuma, Fabrizio Cruciani, Ingemar 
Lindh, Sanjukta Panigrahi, and I Made Pasek Tempo, founders of ISTA” (Barba and Savarese 2006:2).






itself as a strategic area of study:  the actor’s work on herself within a technologically informed 
postdramatic context that is not, for the most part, dependent on the craft of the actor. It is not 
my task in this essay to discuss the seemingly incompatible aspects of tradition and postmoder-
nity, except to indicate that this tension is the impetus behind Lindh’s practice. This introduc-
tion to Lindh is an analysis of the terminological framework that surrounds his practice, 
highlighting Lindh’s vision of collective improvisation. A detailed description of the training 
process and performances of the Institute will be part of a later study.
Social Situation
Lindh identified the “social situation” as a crucial element in collective improvisation.5 The  
term implies considering “the whole context as material for work,” with the context ranging 
from “colleagues, encounters and situations which ensue” (Lindh 1998a:57), to time and  
space, to “actions, costumes, stage props, text, music, etc.” In other words, the social situation 
encapsulates “all that is outside of the actor” (68). Lindh believed that a laboratory-based 
investigation of the mechanisms of social situation could lead to the identification of principles 
of collective improvisation. The dynamics of social situation provided Lindh with the “means 
whereby”6 collaboration among actors could be developed as a discipline with the aim of 
exploring improvisation as a method of organization distinct from directorial montage and 
choreography. By widening the field of signification for the performer, and thus extending the 
limits of what provides performers with the material to generate and organize their work, the 
mechanics of social situation announce a (performance) text that is conducive to the prolifera-
tion of meaning. 
An essential component in the investigation of social situation mechanisms is a context  
where there are two or more actors in “a continuous and constantly changing flux of encoun-
ters” who are in “a state of vigilance,” a “kind of understanding” (1998a:57). Lindh often used 
the term “listen” to underline this state of vigilance, asking actors to “listen to the situation, to 
the colleagues, to one’s own actions and to their resonance” (57). The term “listen” plays a key 
role in Lindh’s investigation of improvisation. For him, “listening” is when “you start to make 
your acts reactions, instead of conscious acts” (in Stanley 1991:56). Though “listening” is used in 
a metaphoric sense to signal a state of bodymind awareness, not unlike Phillip Zarrilli’s image of 
“the body becomes all eyes” (2002:184), there is a nonmetaphoric shade to it that applies to the 
whole body:
This listening does not involve only the ear but the whole being of the actor. Perhaps it is 
not so much a question of “understanding” but of “perceiving.” What is important for the 
actor is to perceive that something has happened. It is not necessary to know “what” has 
happened. Once it is perceived that something “has happened” one can find out “what it 
is” that has happened. (Lindh 1998a:58)
Lindh’s distinction between knowing what has happened and perceiving that something has 
happened is related to the seminal distinction he makes between sense and signification— 
a distinction I will shortly discuss in detail. 
Lindh’s insights on listening in the context of laboratory training are not unique. Most forms 
of actor training in the 20th century have been directed toward fostering an organic state of 
heightened awareness and receptivity. Lindh’s specific contribution is the adoption of listening’s 
irreducible “here and now” aspect as the primary facilitator of an encounter within a composi-
5. In Pietre di Guado, such terms as “social situation” are set in italics rather than in quotation marks as they are here. 
The terms are emphasized not so much to highlight their privileged status as to indicate that they are working 
phrases used by the Institute that do not strictly correspond with their predominant usage (Pietruska 2007).
6. This is a characteristic formulation of Lindh that refers to tools that allow human beings to do something: “When 










tional process that is also an aesthetic and a poetics. In his research, Lindh aspired to cultivate 
the ability of “listening” within a performance situation as the means whereby the spontaneity of 
everyday life can be made present. Though actions and words in a performance are, to varying 
degrees, “already prepared, [. . .] in the moment they should happen they are consequences of 
your listening, and not of your wanting to act” (in Stanley 1991:56). Collective improvisation, 
which allows actors the ability to listen and react, is the frame Lindh used to conduct his 
processual exploration of dramaturgical and compositional devices.
Apart from the “here and now” dimension of improvisational occurrence, Lindh announced 
his postmodernity when he alluded to the nature of “what” is perceived in this kind of listening. 
It is neither “a question of interpreting a situation in an anecdotal manner so as to perform the 
anecdote; nor is it the case of developing it according to a preconceived logic” (1998a:58). Lindh 
spoke instead of finding a “sense,” often by means of dynamics, behind an anecdote or a gesture 
or any other component of the social situation. The difference marked by Lindh’s terms “sense” 
and “signification” is pivotal for determining the status of “what” is perceived in the ability to 
listen, since it is necessarily linked with the legibility of the actor’s work.
Sense and Signification
In Pietre di Guado and other Italian publications, Lindh used the words senso and significato. 
“Senso” can be translated unproblematically as “sense,” marking a very broad territory of 
“making sense,” which is not necessarily related to rationalized thought. “Senso” could be 
anything from a mental image or memory to a tactile feeling or gesture, as long as the image, 
memory, feeling, or gesture has some kind of psychophysical resonance that is recognized by the 
bodymind in the here and now of occurrence. “Significato” is more problematic because it is not 
quite the equivalent of “signification” in English, even if that is the way Lindh himself translated 
the term whenever he spoke in English (see for example Lindh 1995:75).
The problematic distinction between “sense” and “signification” in the Institute’s work is due 
to Lindh’s adoption of the terms from the French to describe very precise phenomena, even 
though not all languages share this distinction. Pietruska observes how in Swedish the same 
word, betydelse, can be used to translate both “sense” and “signification” (2007). In the Swedish 
Figures 3, 4, 5. Ingemar Lindh demonstrating the various ways of “showing” and “pointing” in Decroux 





version of Pietre di Guado, Pietruska and Rolin 
felt compelled to use the French word sens to 
mark “sense/senso” (“the meaning that an act 
or gesture has irrespective of the situation/
context”), and the Swedish betydelse for 
“signification/significato” (“the meaning that 
an act or gesture acquires because of the 
situation/context”) (Pietruska 2007). But this 
still does not adequately describe the phenom-
ena that Lindh is trying to distinguish in 
practice.
From a Saussurian perspective, “significa-
tion” marks the process of becoming meaning 
rather than meaning per se. But there is a 
distinction between Saussure’s and Lindh’s  
use of the term. The way that Lindh uses 
significato is neither the former nor quite the 
latter, even though it announces “meaning” in 
instances that mark a closure of the significa-
tion process. I believe the word “signification” can be rehabilitated as the best fit for Lindh’s 
“significato.” In the Saussurrean process of signification, senso takes on a fixed meaning once the 
arbitrary nature of the bonding between signifier (sound-image) and signified (concept) comes 
to an end and the sign is integrated within a system. But for Lindh, significato is not destined for 
closure; it remains open and provisional in the shifting context of social situations. Lindh asserts 
that it “is not possible to determine the signification of theatre, but only the sense. The signifi-
cation depends on every spectator, we work on the intention” (in Attisani 1987:111). Pietruska 
provides a useful description:
The senso of an accomplished act by the actor is [. . .] immanent to one’s own action; thus 
belonging to the present. In contrast, significato is defined by the social situation and 
changes according to the context. The significato does not belong to the present but to  
a subsequent reading of the context. It is thus fundamental that an actor works in every 
moment on the senso of one’s actions, which does not necessarily have to correspond with 
the significato of the situation. (Giuntoni 2004) 
In this context, “significato” is indeed “signification,” understood as a meaning-in-process  
that reaches closure after the event as an interpretive act and therefore when it is too late to 
influence it in performance. It is in instances such as these that Lindh highlights his post- 
mod ernity, especially in regards to Lyotard’s account of the postmodern artist whose work  
has the character of an event: its realisation in the here and now occurs too soon for its author  
to formulate the rules of its composition—the rules are formulated after the event when it is  
too late (1984:81). Lindh’s interest in the mechanisms of spontaneity in everyday life led him  
to avoid fixed structures and predetermined meanings in theatre, such that signs are not pre- 
determined but dependent on the occurrence of the performative event. Lindh’s position is 
reminiscent of Lehmann’s discussion of the postdramatic use of theatrical signs:
Signs can no longer be separated from their “pragmatic” embeddedness in the event  
and the situation of theatre in general, when the law that governs the use of signs is no 
longer derived from representation within the frame of this event or from its character  
as presented reality but from the intention to produce and render possible a communica-
tive event. (104) 
Lindh’s seminal distinction between sense and signification is evident in his account of the 










possible. Like every other 
aspect of his terminology, 
Lindh’s account of the phrase 
is rooted in practice: 
It can be a musical phrase,  
a physical phrase—a series 
of physical movements— 
or a dynamo-rhythmical, 
literary, melodic, or vocal 
phrase. It is always an  
action that has a begin- 
ning, a development with  
a precise direction, and an 
end. A precise action is 
always a vehicle of sense.  
In a context the sense 
acquires signification, and 
at that point the actor is 
capable of improvising,  
that is, capable of creating 
physical and vocal themes, 
creating visible signs of his 
or her own mental process, 
and changing and develop-
ing them to encounter the 
world around them and 
adapt to a new situation 
without losing the sense.  
In the building of the 
performance, another level 
is added: when two or three 
senses meet, a signification 
comes about [. . .] Even 
though the actor does not work on signification, awareness of it is required for the entire 
structure of performance to be mastered. (1998a:99–100)
In this account, a precise action has the potential of acquiring meaning in a context (a social 
situation) where the actor has the whole picture at one’s disposal, i.e., in a context where no 
constituent element (usually the text, but it can also be a fixed physical score or a choreogra- 
phy) has a predetermined privileged status. The availability of the “whole picture” announces 
the possibility of improvisation, i.e., of “anything could happen.” This aperture character- 
izes a great deal of actor training in the 20th century, especially as developed by Meyerhold, 
Grotowski, and Barba. Lindh’s breakthrough was to appropriate this element as a composi-
tional and aesthetic process within the performance event itself, as in performances such as 
Fresker and To Whom It May Concern (1985) where the actors had an itinerary of phrases or 
encounters (with each other or with objects) but the manner in which these occurred was left 
open and depended on “listening” to the situation.
Reference Points
The framework of improvisation envisaged by Lindh is neither that of “anything goes” nor of 
happenings or performance art. The “anything could happen” dynamic in Lindh’s work is 
Figure 6. Magdalena Pietruska in Saffo (1995), directed  
by Ingemar Lindh, at Teatro della Rosa, Pontremoli, Italy.  





Figure 7. Magdalena Pietruska and Roger Rolin in To Whom It May Concern (1985), directed by 










rooted in the discipline of the actor’s work on precision in the tradition of Decroux and 
Grotowski. The first thing to consider in discussing what is meant by “anything could happen” 
in Lindh’s improvisation work is the paradigm of everyday life:
Theatre is something that is artificial. Life is put inside a frame [. . .] we call “the perfor-
mance.” The actor knows exactly what needs to be done. There is a score. The perfor-
mance starts, the actor moves in a certain manner for a certain length of time, and then 
the performance ends. This never happens in life. I know what I have to do: I know that I 
have to go to a shop to buy something. That is my aim, my intention; but I do not know 
whom or what I shall meet on my way [. . .] We can never foresee what will happen on the 
way even though we know the way. (1998a:65)
Lindh’s research was inspired by the tension that exists in life between the known (e.g., where 
we want to go) and the unknown (e.g., what could happen on the way). 
The known in Lindh’s work is often marked by the presence of reference points that coincide 
with what has already been identified as “the phrase.” The known is also marked by what Lindh 
calls “themes,” which emerge in moments when sense acquires signification (100). The nature  
of a theme is quite complex: it can be “purely physical” (e.g., a gesture, pattern of behavior, or 
special dynamic); “mental” (e.g., the content of an action or an event); “global” (if it marks the 
content of a scene or entire performance); internal or external (to the actor); or a point of arrival 
or departure. A theme could be anything, but the crucial factor is:
that the actor never loses sight of what it is about and what he or she has to remain 
faithful to. It is not possible to make variations on something that is not known; nor is  
it possible to develop it. If one wants to get to the point of varying and developing one’s 
own themes it is imperative to know them. (71)
The theme is thus a reference point that allows the actor to explore variations while at the same 
time securing a form of coherence during improvisation. 
Lindh locates the unknown within the context of the encounter, which ranges from forms  
of exchange with other human beings to contact with inanimate objects in various situations. 
The unknown is not necessarily a mysterious element, and it would be misleading to locate 
Lindh’s unknown within, for instance, Lyotard’s concept of the unpresentable.7 The unknown 
for Lindh is the “not yet known”—which implies that it is knowable and therefore potentially 
presentable. Lyotard’s concept of the unpresentable becomes useful in looking at the “sublime” 
quality that Lindh ascribes to encounters during improvisation (57) and at the sublimation the 
actor’s incarnation of performance material entails (43–46).8 Though not quite the unpresent-
able, the unknown in Lindh functions on a parallel wavelength, generating the “means whereby” 
the improvising actor—unshackled by the constraints of signification but always a carrier of 
sense—challenges the limits of representation in the here and now of occurrence. This chal-
lenge is also announced by Lindh’s view of language: “Are we expressing ourselves thanks to [. . .] 
language, or in spite of [. . .] language? [. . .] It is our fight with [. . .] language that creates expres- 
sion” (in Stanley 1991:92). In Lyotard’s postmodern sentiment of the sublime, allusion to the 
7. Lyotard’s account of the unpresentable is informed by Kant’s sentiment of the sublime. The unpresentable  
marks “ideas of which no presentation is possible” (Lyotard 1984:78), e.g., the infinitely large or small,  
a powerful feeling or a state of being, the universe, “humanity, the end of history, the instant, space, the good” 
(1991:126). The unpresentable defies presentation in that it rests beyond the capabilities of representational 
techniques.
8. To Lindh the term “incarnation” stands for the total assimilation of an exercise or a score of actions (see Lindh 
1998a:44). The use of “sublime” and “sublimation” is informed by Catherine Belsey’s lucid discussion on the over-






unpresentable occurs in the failure of representational devices to fulfill their promise (1984:78–
89; 1991:98). The representational devices that Lindh both implicitly and explicitly problema-
tizes in his practice include directorial montage and choreography—two elements that are still 
prominant in most forms of postdramatic theatre. 
Equivalence
The limits that frame “anything could happen” for Lindh are closely connected to the status 
that he bestows on theatre: “In theatre, certain things can simply not be done. One can only 
pretend to die or to kill. For the act to be ‘true,’ it has to be transformed. One has to find an 
equivalence” (1998a:61; italics added). The artificiality of theatre, which announces the limits  
of what could be done in the scenic space, is also what paradoxically presents the actor with 
infinite possibilities of sense and signification by way of equivalence. 
Equivalence is one of the principles discussed by Barba and Savarese in A Dictionary of 
Theatre Anthropology. An account of Lindh’s demonstration of Decroux’s Le belle courbe opens  
the chapter on equivalence in this book (2006:93). Barba and Savarese observe that equivalence, 
“which is the opposite of imitation, reproduces reality by means of another system. The tension 
of the gesture remains, but it is displaced into another part of the body” (94). Though the for- 
mal structures of mime have been left behind in Lindh’s later work, the precise observation  
of reality that equivalence entails has been retained. Indeed, it has been extended to incorporate 
reality as content (rather than merely as form) in order to “recreate the vital mechanism, that 
permanent alertness which functions spontaneously in everyday life” (Lindh 1998a:72). When  
it partakes of mental precision and intention, “content” is integral to the reference points that 
make improvisation possible.
Figure 8. Pia Andersson, Roger Rolin, Hakan Islinger, and Magdalena Pietruska in To Whom It May Concern 










“Intention” and “mental precision” are other key aspects of Lindh’s work. In the Institute’s 
parlance, “intention” is a composite of “to tend toward” (to project and place oneself in the 
direction of) and “tension” (to mobilize one’s energy in a specific direction). Pietruska 
comments:
Intention in our work terminology indicates this small movement of mind that is at the 
beginning of every act and indicates an act’s mental direction. In life we are always acting 
out of intention. Intention can be conscious or not, and it does not need to be manifested 
through the movement of the body in space. Intention is prior to impulse (which is 
physical, involving directly nervous and muscular systems) and can be concretized both 
through stillness (non-movement) and movement. (2007)
It is important to qualify that this perspective does not imply the predominance of mind over 
body. Lindh’s work on the performer’s psychophysical sensitivity during collective improvisation 
informs and is informed by such “mental action.” In this context, “mental precision” can be 
described as a phenomenon that partakes of bodymind mechanisms in as much as the actor’s 
ability to “listen” and “(re)act” is cultivated by means of codified and empirical forms of actor 
training developed by the Institute.9 
Lindh’s work on mental precision sets him apart from other 20th-century theatremakers, 
including Grotowski, because Lindh was interested in an element that precedes impulse.10 The 
aesthetic that emerges from Lindh’s investigation of mental precision is reminiscent of Lyotard’s 
account of works that belong to the postmodern sublime. In the strategic failure of representa-
tional devices to satisfy their agenda, works that belong to an aesthetic of the sublime achieve 
what Lyotard calls, after Kant, a “negative presentation” that alludes to, rather than represents, 
an “unpresentable” (Lyotard 1984:78; 1991:98). In resisting the predetermined structures of 
directorial montage, fixed scores, and choreography, Lindh’s exploration of collective improvisa-
tion via mental precision is conducive to a process of signification that is always already in 
progress, and that can only be obtained in retrospect when it is too late to condition occurrence. 
And if Lyotard’s unpresentable is reread in light of the Lacanian real that is castrated with the 
advent of language and culture (see Lyotard 1991:1–7),11 then the allusion that permeates the 
sublime aesthetic is to something that, though resistant to presentation, is nonetheless an 
integral part of the human condition. What we are talking about here is an aspect of everyday 
life (a “content”) that becomes perceptible in certain moments of an aesthetic that impossibly 
attempts to operate in a context prior to the closure of Saussurean signification (what Lindh 
marks by senso) by means of an act that can be located prior to physical impulse (what Lindh 
marks by mental action or intention). The complex nature of Lindh’s research makes it neces-
sary to introduce his work by means of an analysis of the framework that surrounds his practice. 
To merely describe the resultant aesthetic of this process risks stagnating the Institute’s perfor-
mances into fixed phenomena—something that they were not. Future publications will tackle 
9. The Institute’s codified training regimen included mime, Kung-Fu, Tai Chi, calligraphy, and music. Empirical  
processes specific to the Institute evolved from an adaptation of sports-based isometric principles to actor training. 
For a detailed account of the Institute’s daily practice and training, including “mental precision,” see Camilleri 
(2008).
10. Pietruska refuses to consider Lindh’s approach as a neat synthesis of Decroux’s and Grotowski’s. His work on  
intention and mental precision, while necessarily building on Decroux and Grotowski, marks a unique develop-
ment that cannot be traced to either master: “For Ingemar it was logical not to return to the physicality of the 
actor; this had already been done and it could only be applied. That which he sought to reach was that which  
was not yet accomplished: to work directly on mental precision” (in Giuntoni 2004).
11. For a lucid discussion on the matter, see Catherine Belsey’s Culture and the Real, especially chapter 8, “The Real 





the issues of the Institute’s training and their performances. The photographs by Stefano 
Lanzardo that accompany this essay provide some visual cues for the conceptual framework 
being discussed here. 
“If God is, God is”
Lindh’s distinction between sense and signification also compels us to reconsider the question  
of motivation: Why does an actor perform an action? An improvisatory paradigm, whose 
exigencies differ from those of montage or fixed scores, necessarily entails a reevaluation of the 
mechanism underscored by motivation.12
In Pietre di Guado Lindh tackles the question of motivation twice in the context of “empty” 
gestures that supposedly lack sense (1998a:61, 73). Lindh defines a gesture as “a sign of an action 
and not the action itself,” thus distinguishing between an action and “the manner in which it is 
accomplished” (35). Though not itself an action, a gesture is part of an action, and an action is 
always a vehicle of sense. Lindh asserts that in the context of a social situation where experi-
enced actors improvise on the basis of reference points, empty gestures do not exist: 
A gesture could initially seem “empty,” but this is not so. Emptiness does not exist. The 
gesture can be more or less clear and eloquent, and one can be more or less aware of it, 
but behind it there is always a sense that can be rediscovered. [. . .] The situation is in a 
continuous state of flux, and it can happen that one unexpectedly accomplishes a gesture 
or an action that one had already accomplished countless times before but now has a 
resonance [. . .] for the actor and those around her. This is the moment when a sense is 
found and the actor’s actions merge with mental themes. (61–62)
The process of totally assimilating an exercise or a score of actions (which Lindh calls 
“incarnation”; 1998a:44), and the generation of situations and encounters, propose an actor 
whose work is not via but towards a signification that remains always open within the confines  
of equivalence. There is no “emptiness” in a context cultivated by mental precision—where the 
actor’s behavior is contextualized by a constellation of wide-ranging reference points. As the 
actor becomes progressively familiar with her own material, the “purely physical aspect becomes 
less important and gives way to content” (62). In content (not to be mistaken with motivation), 
improvisation retains a grip on the structure that makes it possible in the first place. The 
aesthetic elements are free to change because they have not been fixed, but the content—the 
mental precision marked by the cultivation of reference points—is what the actor remains 
faithful to. 
In the first half of the 1980s, the period that influenced the writing of Pietre di Guado,  
the Institute pushed the research on the principles of improvisation to vertiginous extremes  
by processually reducing the referential quality of reference points. In the performance Fresker, 
the demand for exactness of gestures was substituted with a series of “models” that demanded 
flexibility on the actors’ part in the concretization of these reference points. After Fresker, even 
these models were removed so that Lindh’s performers could “concentrate fully on the libera-
tion of the flow of energy [thereby] giving birth to a series of intentions, following no other 
logic (on the level of results) than liberating maximum energy and going beyond one’s limits  
of the possible” (Lindh 1998a:105). This was nothing new as far as training was concerned.  
The laboratories of Wrocław (Grotowski) and Holstebro (Barba) had exposed Lindh to the 
practice of challenging limits by way of biomechanical and plastique training to liberate the  
12. Motivation is distinct from intention. For Lindh an intention to do something (e.g., the mental act that precedes 
throwing a pebble) can be corporally manifested in diverse ways (e.g., a movement of the head). This kind of work 
does not require a motive in answer to the questions: why am I throwing a pebble? or why do I want to throw a 










Figure 9. Magdalena Pietruska in Exercises in Solitude II (1985), directed by Roger Rolin and Ingemar 





flow of energy. The Institute’s specificity was the exploration referred to in the assertion that: 
“Now the exercises were no longer there, [. . .] not even the need to recognize the result of the 
intention in order to then take it up again and transform it into working material [. . .]” (106).
This process of elimination, whose mechanisms are reminiscent of Grotowski’s “via negativa” 
but whose development in the areas of mental precision and collective improvisation is Lindh’s, 
has manifold implications. To do these implications justice while giving a sense of Lindh’s 
approach, I quote him at length: 
All the problems concerning the credibility of the actor based on motivation, identifica-
tion, etc., had been a heritage weighing on the theatre for a long time, an evil considered 
necessary in the process of creation. Nobody, however, has been able to explain concretely 
either what it is or what it consists of, simply because there is no explanation. There are 
no other reasons to act, especially in theatrical reality, except those we find in ourselves. 
[. . .] So, we eliminated the exercises and aesthetic references. The imperative to act 
remained as a residue but without “motivation,” even if this had to be substituted with 
another one. I am not so much referring to a new “reason” here, but to the necessity to 
always concretize a reference 
point. If I admit that action is 
the unproven proof of the 
existence of things, I do not 
need to look for a “reason”  
to act. [. . .] (“Si Deus est, Deus 
est”—“if God is, God is”—is 
the last line of St. Sebastian in 
Fresker. The existence of God 
is not a problem per se; it is 
only a problem when we  
feel the need to prove it to 
ourselves through our own 
actions.) (1998a:106–07)
In this scenario, the web of 
encounters weaved in situ by the 
Institute actors aspires to achieve 
extra-daily status for what is 
essentially the paradigm of everyday life. While it is not difficult to find parallels to Grotowski’s 
and Barba’s training processes, the performance implications of the extreme lengths Lindh 
explored are unique. The resistance to predetermined scores (including the elimination of 
codified exercises and aesthetic references) presents a vertiginous space where the only naviga-
tional coordinate is processual and experiential. In this dimension, the only “motivation” to act 
is the imperative to act in the here and now. Concepts such as “intention,” “precision,” “truth,” 
“memory,” “repetition,” indeed of “theatre” itself as a practice, are placed in a position that 
demands reconsideration. 
The conditions of possibility of such a seemingly impossible practice converge in Lindh’s 
research, which is related to his interest in chaos: 
[B]ecause I happened to end up in the cave of Decroux, precision was given to me as a  
gift. And I never felt the need to search for it any longer; it was just there. And that in  
a way eliminated my fear of chaos, and I started to be more and more curious about the 
perfection or the organic organization of chaos. Because chaos is only our lack of capacity 
of perceiving. (1995:67; see also 1998b:60) 
De Marinis called this “a vision of theatre without restrictions, based on the intimately con-
nected principles of total improvisation and of the actor ‘as author of collective creation hic  
Figure 10. Ingemar Lindh in Porsgrunn, Norway, 1996.  










et nunc ’ ” (quoting Magdalena Pietruska; 2007:289). Collective improvisation can thus be viewed  
as a manifestation of Lindh’s fascination with the “organic organization of chaos.” The means 
that allowed Lindh to conduct this research was a practice that cultivated his ability to listen, 
perceive, and act in the here and now—a bodymind awareness that is not constricted by 
predetermined scores or montage procedures but which instead retains a foothold in structure 
by way of intention understood as mental precision.
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